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Research Highlights 
• This concluding paper draws together current themes related to power in business, 
customer, and market relationships. 
• The evaluations of the contributions to this special issue seek to rationalize the context of 
power, from its origins and contributions to the story, current theory, and practice of power in 
industrial markets. 
• Future directions for the theory and practice of power in business markets are postulated. 
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The current situation and future conceptualization of power in industrial markets 
Abstract 
This article offers overview of research on power in industrial and business markets, 
conducted through the 10 articles in the special issue. These contributions are catalysts for 
defining the history, context, current situations, and future developments and prospects for 
power in the business world. Therefore, this article presents a conceptualization and 
understanding of power, using the special issue as a lens through which to view past 
antecedents, present understanding, and future directions. In addition to studies that mine past 
and present academic and practical rationales for power, the empirically based contributions 
test and explore power. This article identifies and thematically draws out and labels the 
principal manifestations across these contributions, to link origins with current principal foci 
and identify the most likely emphases of theory and practice for the future business-to-
business arena. 
 
Keywords: power, industrial marketing, business marketing, theory, practice. 
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1. Introduction 
As a concept relevant to the theory and practice of business, power has great importance 
and thus has attracted substantial attention from business academics, though with somewhat 
patchy coverage. Considerable early research came from industrial marketers who focused on 
reapplications of theory derived from interpersonal human relations (e.g., Emerson, 1962; 
French & Raven, 1959; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959), such that they defined power according to 
human interactions and applied it to business exchanges. For example, researchers interested 
in industrial markets and the influence of power in interfirm exchanges, who adopted the 
views of the Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group (IMP), modelled power with an 
interactionist framework; featuring dyadic, and then network interactions. Industrial 
Marketing Management (IMM) was then and remains at the forefront of defining, 
interpreting, and developing knowledge about power in business contexts and has constituted 
the forum for advanced thought on the subject.  
In 2005, IMM had an instrumental role in setting the research agenda: In Volume 34, 
Issue 8, it departed from traditional approaches and published a contribution that challenged 
the generally accepted preconceptions of a negative view of power. That is, asymmetry had 
been regarded as unacceptable, unworkable, or just plain wrong, according to an idealistic 
objection to coercive power plays. However, Hingley (2005a) shone a new light on power, 
revealing it to be not some toxic alien force but rather a constant presence, for which 
asymmetry was acceptable and workable. Hingley also called for a better understanding of 
power and the motives of the participants in ongoing, relationally fluid, interfirm exchanges. 
In what became a mini-debate within the issue, Kumar (2005), Naude (2005), and Blois 
(2005) commented on the contribution, and then Hingley (2005b) responded. Yet even this 
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influential volume of IMM did not contain sufficient consideration of power in business. Ten 
years later, IMM is the appropriate place to revisit power with a fuller treatment. 
With this concluding article, we seek to bring the field up to date by providing an 
overview of current thinking about power, in the context of industrial and business markets, 
as indicated by the important themes emerging from this special issue. The following 10 
articles, with their varying approaches and emphases, draw out several themes that underpin 
and challenge the conditions and applications of power in business, customer, and market 
relationships. They collectively address the history and origins of power, its current thematic 
emphases, and its potential new directions and treatments. We identify the following themes:  
1. The analyses of the antecedents of power often hark back to its long-standing, 
fragmented treatment in both academia and practice. Thus, the first theme to 
emerge is the pursuit of an understanding of the origins, definitions, interplay, and 
applications of power in an interpersonal context, and its application to business 
relations.  
2. Authors seek to pin down and define key concepts surrounding power, such as 
trust and the nature of asymmetry.  
3. From the start, industrial marketers have sought to model and measure power in 
interfirm relations. The third theme thus pertains to the accuracy and 
appropriateness of measuring power.  
4. Most investigations, analyses, and interpretations of power have focused on 
interfirm exchanges. But, why is our focus drawn to (often dyadic) interfirm 
exchanges?  
5. The study of power often hones in on particular business contexts and 
circumstances. The final theme involves why certain business sectors and contexts 
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(e.g., retailing and food supply) constitute such rich material for researchers 
seeking to understand power in the business world. 
After delineating this theme-based analysis, we suggest some avenues for research that 
considers power in relation to business, customer, and market relationships. Finally, we bring 
this issue to a close with some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Special issue contributions and themes of power 
2.1. Learning from interpersonal relationships 
The authors whose work appears in this special issue analyze the origins of power 
from interpersonal perspectives, to define and interpret, as well as measure and model, 
power. For example, Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg chart the development of applications of 
interpersonal power to interfirm settings, invoking the widely cited types of power introduced 
by French and Raven (1959) (expert, reference, legitimate, reward, and coercive). They also 
draw inspiration from Yeung, Selen, Zhang, and Huo (2009), regarding coercive and non-
coercive power dimensions, to highlight the development of power sources that dominant 
firms use in coercive and non-coercive ways, to ensure partnership governance that reflects 
their own interests. Similarly, Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson draw on Emerson’s 
(1962) chronicles of power and dependency, from a basis of interpersonal relations. Business 
researchers often use social exchange theory (Emerson, 1962; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), such 
that it remains a prominent research framework for describing interfirm power. In addition, 
Kumar (2005) summarizes several definitions of power, including dependence, punitive 
capability, non-coercive influence strategies, and punitive actions, and refers to the latter as 
the antithesis of trust in relationships. He asserts that punitive action makes power imbalances 
intolerable. Trust and commitment (e.g., Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Ganesan, 1994; Geyskens, 
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Steencamp, Scheer & Kumar 1996) also moderate business relationships, and these concepts 
are informative for this issue’s contributors (e.g., Chicksand).  
 
2.2. Understanding and redefining asymmetry 
Most considerations of asymmetry in business relationships define relationship 
protagonists as “haves” or “have nots,” creating a state of imbalance that might be 
determined by size (Cox, 1999) or other factors, such as channel position or brand leadership. 
Asymmetry thus appears as a negative, problematic issue for interfirm relations; Marcos-
Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson even note that it has been cited as the cause of 
breakdowns in trust. However, these authors and Munksgaard, Johnsen, and Patterson 
propose a different view of asymmetry. Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson note how 
goal alignment can build trust and moderate asymmetry; Munksgaard, Johnsen, and Patterson 
consider the influence of goal alignment, but argue that imbalanced exchanges can be 
subdivided further into two distinct types of asymmetric relationships: product/technology 
development–oriented asymmetric relationships or complementary competencies–oriented 
asymmetric relationships. With their empirical work, they determine that small suppliers that 
actively pursue their self-interest in connection with larger, more powerful buyers realise 
greater success; the larger buyers recognize the value of joint goal seeking for deriving 
collective market and profitability benefits.  
Such insights reflect the views of Hingley (2005a), Hingley and Lindgreen (2010), 
Belaya and Hanf (2009), and Easton (2002), who describe how acceptance of asymmetry 
might lead to workable co-creation, even in an imbalanced state. Munksgaard, Johnsen, and 
Patterson bring the characteristics of the relationship (presence of trust, cooperation, power 
dependence) to the fore as moderators; despite the imbalance, smaller, perceivably weaker 
parties can thrive if they have a self-interested drive (Johnson & Ford, 2006, 2008) and a 
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creativity-based advantage that larger partners/buyers desire. According to Munksgaard, 
Johnsen, and Patterson, asymmetric relationships often function well, regardless of size 
imbalance issues, but relationship characteristics can have more detrimental effects, notably 
as they relate to levels of cooperation.  
Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg, citing Mohr and Spekman, (1994), question the lack 
of knowledge about the trade-offs firms make (particularly the loss of autonomy) when 
entering such relationships. They model this detail and argue that partner firms, “especially 
the weaker ones, may choose to stay in a relationship even when the dominant firm relies on 
strong and possibly unpleasant influence strategies” (Kumar, 2005, p. 865, in terms of 
punitive capabilities and actions), “as long as there are still benefits of doing so” (Cox and 
Chicksand, 2005; Ramsey, 1996; Hingley, 2005a). Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg thus add 
valuable understanding about the gradations of asymmetric relationships for defining 
“exploitative” versus “tolerable” relationships, as well as how weaker parties can (re)position 
themselves to achieve the tolerable form or even, though rarely, an “ideal” (high commitment 
and trust, open communication) relationship. Because such ideal relationships are rare, they 
are prone to disruption by organizations, which naturally seek to secure an inequitable 
proportion of relationship value for themselves (Cox, 2004).  
Such considerations also can be viewed according to a fluid framework of the 
business environment, in which relationships do not and cannot stay the same (Hingley, 
2005b). The issue of relationship fluidity in existing interfirm relationships has tremendous 
impacts on the conduct and maintenance of asymmetrical relationships. In his empirical 
work, Chicksand notes that what appear to be identifiable types of relationships can change, 
and the status of a relationship between, say, nominally interdependent parties, evolves as a 
result of power to become more buyer or supplier dominant. Von Bockhaven, Mathyssens, 
and Vandenbempt also believe that weaker parties can reduce the influence of that power 
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over them, through the use of “soft power,” achieved through alignment rather than enforced 
interests. In contrast, “hard power” might be expressed by powerful buyers, according to a 
size–power asymmetry, coercion, or reward control. Soft power instead requires 
collaborative, cooperative, and trust-based behaviour, without resorting to head-on conflict or 
coercion. 
In their studies, Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson and Munksgaard, 
Johnsen, and Patterson regard aspirations for joint goals and goal congruence as influential in 
determining the effects of power. Even in asymmetric conditions, power can be mediated 
through the alignment of the parties’ goals. Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson posit 
that goal congruence mediates relationships, whether symmetrical or asymmetrical, such that 
congruence is a prerequisite of trust in either condition. Again citing their concept of soft 
power, in conditions in which trust is important, Von Bockhaven, Mathyssens, and 
Vandenbempt note the possibility of nuanced outcomes in asymmetrical relationships. That 
is, when interfirm parties’ interests align, trust can be built and maintained, and the effects of 
power may be less prevalent, even if one party holds sway.  
2.3. Measuring and modelling power 
As Cowan, Paswan and Steenburg point out, most views of power in business 
contexts treat it as “a bad thing” and recommend interfirm exchanges that take place between 
equal, sharing, dyadic, or channel partners in a non-coercive environment. A contrary view 
holds that asymmetry and unequal spoils are the norm (Batt, 2004; Hingley, 2005a). Other 
authors argue that power should be central to any study of interfirm relationships (Cox, 
Sanderson, Watson, & Lonsdale, 2001). According to Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg 
though, the detail and nuances that are apparent in power measurements for (asymmetrical) 
business relations remain less clear.  
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Some research has modelled the nature of power, such as in Cox et al.’s (2001) power 
regimes. Cox (2004) takes the buyer’s perspective and suggests that the most appropriate way 
for a supplier to manage commercial transactions with buyers depends on its power and 
leverage circumstances. With a better understanding of the changing roles between buyers 
and suppliers, sales/procurement strategies could produce better rewards in the future. Cox 
(2001) also models the attributes of buyer and supplier power and suggests that relationships 
may be governed by their position on a matrix, in which quadrants signal buyer dominance, 
interdependence, independence, or supplier dominance. We again note a caveat identified by 
Hingley (2005b), namely, that there is inter- and intra-firm fluidity across the four cells of the 
matrix, so firms can reposition themselves or be repositioned by environmental and exchange 
circumstances. To further this model of power, Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg seek to move 
beyond naming the parts of relationships, and propose a conceptual framework of 
relationships as exploitative, tolerable, ideal, or awkward. Chicksand also refers to Cox’s 
work to re-raise the issue of the effect of power on partnerships.  
Some commentators view partnerships as higher forms of relationships, modelled as 
advanced levels of interfirm integration (e.g., Webster, 1992). Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
believe partnerships are possible if compatible goals exist, along with mutual benefits and 
interdependence. However, the term suffers from a “woolly” definition and some 
interchangability with other terms (e.g., alliance), as well as an implied equality between 
partners, even if it does not exist in reality. In some ways, partnership exemplifies the ideal 
relationship described by Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg, though the term begs questions in 
the same way that ‘ideal’ relationships do. That is, it exudes the same uneasy vision of 
higher-level perfection, grounded in theoretical, attribute-driven analysis. Neither term takes 
into full account the ability of power (and power plays) to intervene. Chicksand brings 
necessary focus to the issue by noting that though Cox extensively identifies and categorizes 
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interfirm relationships and power, the prior work does not address how to measure it. 
Considering the cost and effort that exchange parties must invest to achieve higher 
relationship forms, including partnerships, it would be useful to learn how they can be shaped 
and maintained for long-term effectiveness. Chicksand thus concludes empirically that even 
when organizations lack compatible goals, mutual benefits, or interdependence, they might be 
called partnerships. In their empirical work, Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson 
similarly find that a supposed partner or symmetrical organization does not necessarily 
embrace aligned goals. Asymmetrical relationships instead might be more workable, whereas 
symmetrical ones may be at risk, due to a lack of engagement or complacency. Chicksand 
argues that if it is possible to understand where organizations stand with respect to one 
another on Cox’s power matrix (he offers some identifiable relationship measurement 
methods), and some consciousness of the potential for overlapping, indiscernible power 
positions remains, then the possibility of a partnership is more identifiable within the 
boundaries of the effects of power.  
2.4. Power, intrafirm, and interfirm relationships 
Academic investigations of power in interfirm relationships feature a prevalence of 
dyadic studies. Munksgaard, Johnsen, and Patterson; Chicksand; and Palmer, Simmons, 
Robinson, and Fearne give due regard to the work of the interactionist IMP Group (1982), 
which offers an additional network orientation for power work, yet dyadic customer–supplier 
relationships remain the mainstay (e.g., Anderson, Hakansson, & Johansson, 1994; Dwyer, 
Schurr, & Oh, 1987). The dominance of dyadic studies spans from the previously cited work 
of Cox and Hingley to investigations by Narayandras and Rangan (2004) in the automotive 
industry and O’Keefe and Fearne (2002) in grocery retailer relationships.  
Two-part exchanges are more accessible and perhaps replicable than studies of power 
that feature multiple tiers of interfirm relations or the even greater complexity of power in 
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networks. However, such a focus begs the question: Have other organizational and 
infrastructural forms been neglected, such as triadic or multi-tier, horizontal (collaborative 
and cooperative), or intra-organizational relationships? As such, Najafi-Tavani, Zaefarian, 
Naudé, and Giroud concern themselves with subsidiary power, that is, how a subsidiary 
asserts power over its parent company. They contend that the key is the assertion of 
subsidiary autonomy and reverse knowledge transfer (e.g., research, sales, marketing data, 
systems, practical knowledge), to leverage its influence subtly at the head office. This 
assertion resonates with previous discussions about gradation and bolstering partners on the 
receiving end of asymmetric positions (e.g., Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson; 
Munksgaard, Johnsen, and Patterson; Cowan, Paswan, and Steenburg), as well as with the 
role of soft power in asymmetric positions (Von Bockhaven, Mathyssens, and Vandenbempt).  
2.5. Why is power considered so often in retailing and food supply relationships? 
It is not by design that this special issue features two sectors so heavily as topics for 
analysis. Specifically, six of the ten author groups in this special issue exhibit particular 
interest in investigating power in the interfirm relationships between retailers and suppliers 
and within food channels. Some of this interest might follow from the emphasis on research 
by Hingley and Cox, who also study food and retailing sectors; these sectors provide rich 
contexts for the study of power. For example, Maglaras, Bourlakis, and Fotopoulos 
investigate food retailing relationships to understand power imbalances, and they invoke the 
issue of the desirability of goal alignment (Marcos-Cuevas, Julkunen, and Gabrielsson; 
Munksgaard, Johnsen, and Patterson), recommending that individual organizations should 
develop supply chain–level goals that align the interests of different members and increase 
their compatibility, to create value for the overall chain (Gagalyuk, Hanf, & Hingley, 2013). 
These authors acknowledge the weakness of retailer power–oriented supply chains for food 
suppliers, in terms of goal incompatibility (especially financial goals) with exchange partners, 
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rather than retailer-led asymmetry. They also find that informational asymmetry, caused by a 
lack of knowledge sharing, reaffirms power imbalances. The heart of the issue again is trust 
(with information and data)—or the lack of it (as a cause of power issues). As Maglaras, 
Bourlakis, and Fotopoulos identify, this may be yet another reason food retailer supply chains 
are so popular for study: They show a marked shift in power, from supplier to retailer, in 
recent years (Fernie, 2014). Thus they demonstrate the prevalence of power dependence, such 
that asymmetry remains the reality in relationship exchanges (Hingley, 2005a).  
Asymmetry can be viewed simply as a means of effective coordination, integration, 
and goal attainment (Belaya & Hanf, 2009). What is interesting in this context is the 
possibility of gradation and modification of asymmetry, using goal alignment and trust-based 
exchanges. The study of interfirm relationships and power may be so prevalent in supplier–
retailer settings because, in asymmetric exchange conditions, retailers set the rules of the 
game in the form of general terms and conditions of trade. This is not unusual in exchange 
relationships; one party sets product, service, and quality specifications, for example. 
However, in grocery retailing, the power shift to the party that is nearest the end user offers 
the potential for some interesting observations. Rindt and Mouzas consider the German 
grocery sector, investigating how more powerful parties (retailers) use private rules (non-
legal sanctions) in asymmetric relationships to exercise their power. Retailers enforce trading 
and business conditions, using sanctions and interventions that institutionalize power 
asymmetries. The use of the private rules (e.g., product quality, service delivery) enforces 
power dependency. It is thus no coincidence that retailing, particularly for food and grocery 
items, has moved strongly into private label goods, produced solely for the retailer and 
bearing signals of its identity. In such conditions, the retailer has brand control over the 
supplier, and private rules enforce dependency in private-label supply. Rindt and Mouzas 
further illustrate the significance of outsourcing policies, not just for control over brand 
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production but in service delivery as well (e.g., from outsourced research and development to 
entire supply chain management), which offsets the risk for retailers. Furthermore, the 
process of retailer-led reductions in supply chain members and the development of 
“preferred” suppliers (Collins & Burt, 2003; Hingley, 2005a) have made large business 
accounts much more important to retail suppliers, invoking accentuated asymmetry in favour 
of the buyer.  
An “enforcement, sanction, intervention” approach leaves open the possibility of 
punitive action and thus institutionalizes power asymmetry. For grocery retailing, such an 
asymmetric model is common and successful. Rindt and Mouzas show that suppliers’ need to 
satisfy private rules also requires them to take responsibility for legislative rules (e.g., public 
health, food adulteration), but by outsourcing responsibility for these requirements through 
private rules, the more powerful parties (i.e., retailers) gain a further means for asymmetric 
control. Rindt and Mouzas therefore demonstrate that when the rules of the exchange are 
controlled by the stronger party and adapted as it sees fit, asymmetry gets reinforced, and the 
dilution that might be achieved by goal congruence becomes less possible. Evolving business 
conditions continue to be the norm for European and global food supply chains, especially in 
the wake of a series of scandals surrounding food contamination. Ultimately, retailers suffer 
from the negative publicity surrounding such high-profile events, but if they use private rules 
as sanctions, they can shrug off some of the responsibility to their providers, which mitigates 
their risk. This scenario also reinforces asymmetric power. In response, the general sense of 
inequity among government agents and even consumers has prompted some state 
intervention. For example, the United Kingdom recently addressed the largely unregulated 
world of privately controlled retailer food supply chain relationships by appointing a 
Groceries Code Adjudicator to sit in independent judgment on complaints from suppliers 
about their treatment from retail buyers, abuses of power, or unfair practices (Groceries Code 
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Adjudicator, 2015). It will be interesting to see if such political intervention has an impact, 
beyond that exerted by public scrutiny and sanctions of power inequities in this sector, or if 
instead the better option for suppliers would be managed asymmetry (e.g., goal alignment).  
Finally, in the grocery sector, considerable studies investigate and model dyadic 
exchanges, but we lack knowledge and understanding of the operation and maintenance of 
power in asymmetry, from the perspective of practitioners involved in it. Personalized 
accounts of how business exchanges operate are uncommon; where there is inequity, 
exchange partners are less inclined to talk about it, perhaps for fear of sanctions. Such 
investigations thus are rare, with minimal academic considerations of inequity in business 
exchange (e.g., Hornibrook, Fearne, & Lazzarin, 2009). Palmer, Simmons, Robinson, and 
Fearne adopt an ethnographic approach to understand the daily operations of power for 
grocery retailers, bringing together suppliers and buyers from dominant retailer organizations 
in workshops. With this inside view, they determine how the management of institutional 
maintenance helps preserve power. This empirical study reveals the conditions of business 
life lived in asymmetry, through a close analysis of power dynamics from the perspective of 
the actual protagonists, as well as power plays associated with hard and soft power that 
retailers use to legitimize the kind of sanctions that Rindt and Mouzas describe. However, the 
process of perceiving power in relational exchanges from the viewpoint of respondents on 
both sides suggests the potential mitigation of power (through goal alignment). Regardless of 
the level of power imbalance in the relationship, if “insider views” can reveal the nature of 
the power dynamic, then weaker parties can at least understand and potentially realign 
themselves to achieve more manageable, beneficial conditions within the asymmetry. 
3. Directions for research and for power 
Najafi-Tavani, Zaefarian, Naudé, and Giroud make an important departure in the 
study of power in business relations; it is easy to identify other useful intra-firm replications 
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that could contribute to internal power debates, perhaps even across the different sites, 
departments, or functions of a business, where extensive intra-organizational power plays 
take place. Important investigations might address issues of power between bureaucratic and 
operational functions, marketing and purchasing, or marketing and operations. Another 
avenue could be opened by Internet and online exchanges. In their contribution, Fukawa and 
Zhang examine the current challenges of power by exploring the use of non-coercive power 
in an open-source (web-accessed) context. Evidence of asymmetric relationships arises, such 
that strong, branded technology sector players (e.g., Google Android) take the lead, but they 
do not prevent gains by technology partners that use (according to profit-sharing agreements) 
the open source material available from these technology giants. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this summary of the special edition on power in business, customer, and market 
relationships, we solicit the antecedents of power in business markets and draw out themes 
from the compendium of published articles in this issue. Thus, we have identified some 
important insights regarding the current state and future conceptualization of power in 
industrial markets. Most notably, we highlight a common theme about the nature of symmetry 
and asymmetry in interfirm relations: What was once idealized, namely, a symmetrical 
partnership, might be less than ideal. Equivalence and balance in exchanges have downsides, 
such as a lack of incentive or congruence. The most interesting outcomes stem from 
asymmetry. Furthermore, the seemingly negative conditions of asymmetry may contain 
positive attributes. In imbalanced relationships, gradations of asymmetry exist, and the 
possibilities of trust-based exchange belie the apparent imbalance, such that they might 
facilitate longer-term exchanges marked by goal congruence and trust.  
In analyzing the recent history of academic thought in industrial marketing (through 
an appraisal of the content of power articles in IMM), we note a predominance of theoretical 
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analyses related to interfirm, dyadic exchanges, with empirical investigations of the same, as 
well as a disproportionate interest in food chain and retailing power issues and illustrations. 
We would welcome further theoretical explorations and interpretations in other sectors, 
especially in efforts to meet the new business challenges posed by high technology, online, 
and virtual relationships and their consequent power issues. In terms of theory, we believe 
that there is still a gap with respect to causal research and welcome further experimentation 
concerning power, and perhaps investigation using longitudinal methods. Finally, we note a 
gap in multitier, multinational, network, and intra-organizational studies with respect to 
understanding and achieving the empirical application of power in industrial business, 
customer, and market relationships.  
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